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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Cert. No. 
Category No. 13 
vs. : 
CHAD A. GARDINER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
APPELLANTfS PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held, sua 
sponte, that defendant can be convicted of assaulting and 
interfering with a peace officer when the defendant resisted a 
forcible search and arrest that the Court of Appeals held 
violated defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that 
appellant did not challenge the trial court's finding that the 
officer did not use excessive force when in fact appellant 
raised that very issue in Point II of his brief? 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was an unofficial 
opinion not selected for publication. The opinion is attached 
hereto in its entirety as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals filed an unpublished decision 
affirming the conviction on April 17/ 1989. Appellant filed a 
Petition for Rehearing on or about April 28, 1989. The Court 
of Appeals entered an order denying appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing on May 8, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(a) which provides appellate 
jurisdiction over "a judgment of the Court of Appeals". 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution 
Section 76-5-102.4 U.C.A. 
Section 76-8-305 U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant Chad Gardiner is the son of John 
Gardiner, owner of Dinaland Aviation in Vernal, Utah. (TR 49, 
lines 18-20) John Gardiner leases the Dinaland Aviation 
hanger from Uintah County and Vernal City on a twenty year 
lease. 
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2. On the 16th day of April 1988 John Gardiner gave 
defendant permission to have a party at the Dinaland hanger 
for defendant and his invitees. A band played at the party 
and beer and soft drinks were served. The party was held in 
the hanger part of the Dinaland structure in which the public 
is not invited and only authorized personnel are allowed. (TR 
52, lines 14-18) 
3. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on the morning of April 
17, 1988, central dispatch received an anonymous complaint 
that there was a loud party in progress in a blue building 
near the airport and that minor were present consuming 
alcohol. (TR 10, lines 19-25) 
4. Officer Lytle proceeded to the blue building and 
investigated but saw no signs of a party at that structure. 
(TR 11, lines 11-15) 
5. Shortly thereafter Officer **I#tle saw individuals 
and automobiles by the Dinaland structure and proceeded to 
investigate. (TR 11, lines 16-23) 
6. Deputy Lytle then approached the Dinaland 
structure together with Officer Hatzidakis and reserve officer 
Terry Shiner. (TR 40-41, lines 20-16) 
7. While talking to individuals outside the hanger, 
Officers Shiner and Hatzidakis saw that several individuals 
were closing the hanger door. (TR 23, lines 9-17) 
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8. Officer Shiner ran towards the door ordering the 
individuals to leave the door open. (TR 40-41, lines 20-2) 
9. Officer Hatzidakis approached the hanger door and 
stated he wanted to enter the structure to check 
identification and search for minors. (TR 24, lines 14-16) 
(testimony of Hatzidakis) 
10. After observing persons who he believed to be 
minors within the building, after having observed the general 
use of alcohol in the area, and after having noted a heavy 
odor of alcohol at the entrance to the building, Officer 
Hatzidakis announced his intention to enter the premises to 
check the area within the building for minors. Officer 
Hatzidakis informed those present of the reasons that he had 
been dispatched to the area. (Trial Court's Finding #9) 
11. The defendant, who was within the building, then 
informed Officer Hatzidakis that his father~"bwned the Dinaland 
Aviation Building. The defendant also gave Officer Hatzidakis 
his name. The foregoing exchange between the officer and the 
defendant occurred at the doorway or just inside the door. 
(Trial Courtfs Finding #10) 
12. During the exchange of information between the 
defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, the defendant inquired as to 
whether the officer possessed a warrant. When he was informed 
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by the officer that the officer had no warrant, the defendant 
announced that the officer could not enter the premises. At 
about that time the defendant stepped within 8 to 10 inches of 
Officer Hatzidakis and reached his arm out to his side to a 
table in order to prevent the officer from entering. (Trial 
Court's Finding #11) 
13. The officer then shoved defendant out of the way 
and entered the premises. (Trial Court's Finding #12) The 
force of the shove knocked defendant back onto a table that 
collapsed beneath him, spilling beer and drinks on top of him. 
(Mimmick testimony, pp 55-56, lines 18-2; Baker testimony, pp 
73-74, lines 21-4; Godsey testimony, p 81, lines 8-17) 
14. The defendant, after having recovered from the 
shove by Officer Hatzidakis, came forward and struck Officer 
Hatzidakis in the face with his (defendant's) fist. The force 
of the defendant's blow and the resultitr^ contact between the 
defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, knocked the officer outside 
where an altercation occurred between the defendant and all 
three police officers who were present. Trial Court's Finding 
#13) 
15. During the altercation, Officer Hatzidakis 
informed the defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant 
heard and understood this announcement and answered that he 
was not under arrest. After having been informed of his 
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arrest, the defendant vigorously resisted arrest and in the 
process against struck Officer Hatzidakis in the face with his 
(defendant's) fist. (Trial Court's Finding #14) 
16. Dinaland Aviation has at least three exits to the 
building. There were from 30 to 50 people present. 
Approximately 15 to 20 people were located within the buildin 
or immediately adjacent (at the doorway) to the building. The 
remaining individuals were scattered around the parking lot 
and airplane storage area which was adjacent to the building. 
(Trial Court's Finding #15) 
17. The Dinaland Aviation building is a commercial 
building which is not used as a residence. The building is 
used to accomodate parties two or three times a year. (Trial 
Court's Finding #16) 
18. The case was tried to the court on May 8, 1988. 
At trial, the court asked counsel to brief the issue of the 
legality of the officer's conduct. 
19. The parties submitted memoranda of law. After 
reviewing the memoranda the court issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on August 22, 1989 finding the defendant 
guilty and holding that there were exigent circumstances to 
justify the warrantless search and arrest of defendant. 
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20. Defendant was sentenced on September 7, 1988. 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals on 
September 8, 1988. 
21. The parties submitted briefs and the matter was 
set for disposition pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
22. The matter was briefed and argued to the Court on 
the issues of the legality of the warrantless search and 
arrest and the peace officer's excessive use of force. 
23. On April 17, 1989, the Court issued its opinion 
wherein it agreed with appellant that the search and arrest 
were illegal but affirmed by sua sponte raising and decided 
that there is no common law right to resist an unlawful arrest 
in this jurisdiction. 
24. The Court failed to address appellant's 
contention that the officer used excessive force. 
25. Appellant filed a Petition for Rehearing arguing 
that the Court's decision was in direct conflict with this 
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1975) and that the Court ignored Point II of appellant's brief 
regarding excessive use of force. 
26. The Petition for Rehearing was denied on May 8f 
1989. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' J3UA SPONTE DECISION THAT THERE 
IS NO RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH OR ARREST IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V, BRADSHAW, 541 
P.2d 800 (UTAH 1975). 
The Court of Appeals decided this case on an issue not 
raised or briefed by the parties, to-wit: Is the right to 
resist an unlawful arrest recognized in this jurisdiction? 
The Court apparently decided the issue as a case of first 
impression in Utah as no previous decision of this Court or 
the Court of Appeals was cited as authority for the 
proposition anywhere in the opinion. See Exhibit A. Indeed 
in State v. Duran, 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 (Utah App. 1989), a 
different panel noted that the issue had not been decided in 
Utah. Ij3. at 62, n.4. 
State v. Duran, supra, involved a charge of assault by 
a prisoner wherein the defendant requested an instruction 
regarding his right to resist unlawful and unconstitutional 
actions of a prison guard. The Court rejected the analogy to 
unlawful arrests by stating that "the right to resist an 
unlawful arrest is normally limited to the resistance 
necessary to avoid or escape arrest . . ." (Citations 
omitted) "In an unlawful prison transfer situation, there is 
simply no place to go to resist the alleged unlawful or 
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unconstitutional act of prison guards." As the Court noted in 
footnote 4 of its opinion: 
There is disagreement among jurisdictions as to 
a private citizen's right to resist an unlawful 
arrest. Some jurisdictions have modified the 
traditional common law right to resist an 
unlawful arrest by reasonable force, and hold 
that a person may resist an unlawful arrest only 
in those instances where excessive force is used 
to effectuate the arrest. (Citations omitted) 
Other jurisdictions hold that a person "may not 
use force to resist a peaceful arrest by one he 
knows or has a good reason to believe, is an 
authorized peace officer performing his duties, 
regardless of whether the arrest is illegal." 
(Citations omitted) This issue has not been 
resolved in Utah. 
Id. 106 Utah Adv. Rep. at 62, n.4 (Emphasis added) 
There is therefore a conflict between panels of the 
Court of Appeals on this issue. The opinion also in in 
conflict with this Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 
P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). 
In Bradshaw, this Court '^struck down as 
unconstitutional a statute that made it illegal to interfere 
with a law enforcement official regardless of whether there is 
a legal basis for the arrest. As the Court stated: 
The language of the particular statute we are 
here dealing with is undoubtedly subject to the 
constitutional challenge of vagueness. That 
part of the statute "regardless of whether there 
is a legal basis for the arrest" may be subject 
to various meanings and interpretations. If the 
intention of the legislature was to penalize a 
law-abiding citizen by incarceration because he 
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did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, 
a statute authorizing the same is in violation 
of both the Utah/ and United States 
Constitutions, as above referred to in that it 
permits and authorizes an arrest without 
probable cause and without lawful basis for the 
arrest. 
Id, at 801. (Emphasis added) 
The language that most bothered this Court in Bradshaw 
was "regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the 
arrest." Yet, the construction given the current §76-5-102.4 
and §76-8-305 by the Court of Appeals implicitly amends that 
very language back into the statute. Moreover, the anomoly of 
convicting an individual for assaulting an officer and 
interfering with an officer who, while illegally entering a 
building after being denied admission for not having a 
warrant, proceeded to shove his way through the doorway is 
best described in Justice Henroid's concurring opinion: 
It seems to me to be somewhat df* a departure 
from reality and practicality and even morality 
to say a statute is constitutional that says one 
person can violate the law and by virtue of such 
illegal act induce another to indulge in a 
confrontation which he did not seek and get six 
months because a possible tormenter, acting 
illegally, goaded him into it. It is a rather 
superficial answer to say, as do the dissenters 
here, that having perhaps unwittingly 
"interfered" in an arrest, with the sometimes 
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that someone 
"might" attach to the word, the "interferer," 
acting in good faith, not having read this funny 
statute, should be content to lose his job, his 
good name in the community, his liberty for six 
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months, and his respect for the establishment, 
in exchange for the great privilege of hiring a 
lawyer going to court to seek damages (which are 
no substitute for loss of freedom), -all because 
one of the countless hordes of law enforcement 
officials not only committed a pediculous, but 
illegal rip-off in making what is worse, the 
arrest of a person who at common law had a 
perfect right to resist, and who, but for this 
paternalistic, autocratic legislation in a free 
society, could resist arrest, and who as of now, 
can resist arrest if it happens to be classified 
as a citizen's arrest. 
Id, at 804. (Emphasis added) 
This Court has sanctioned the common law rule that one 
is entitled to resist an illegal arrest or search as the case 
may be. Indeed the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this 
case is remarkably similar to the dissenting opinion in 
Bradshaw filed by Justice Crockett. _Id. 541 P.2d at 806-807. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is in conflict 
with a previous decision of the Utah Supreme Court and should 
be withdrawn. The Court should therefSfe grant the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari and review this matter as to the issues 
raised and decided sua sponte by the Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENT REGARDING EXCESSIVE FORCE BECAUSE APPELLANT 
SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGED THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE OFFICER 
ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AND THAT THE OFFICER 
DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE. 
The Court of Appeals held in its opinion that 
"defendant does not challenge the Court's specific finding 
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that the officer reasonably acted to preserve his own safety 
when he pushed defendant away and that the force used was not 
excessive." 
The appellant specifically challenged both findings 
however in Point II of defendant's trial memorandum and Point 
II of the Appellate Brief. Defendant therefore specifically 
challenged the trial court's findings on excessive force. 
Moreover, appellant raised the question of whether the officer 
could be acting within the scope of his authority if he 
illegally enters the premises. These issues were thus 
properly briefed before the trial court and Court of Appeals 
and deserve consideration on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals held that the search and seizure 
was illegal. Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court grant a writ of certiorari to Review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals in light of this Court's decision in 
State v. Bradshaw to consider whether the officer used 
excessive force. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ^ day of June, 1989. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY H./SOUVALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to Alvin G. Nash, Uintah County Attorney, 
Attorney for Respondent, 152 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 
84078 on this day of June, 1989. 
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ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE Ms^ 
Case No. 880557-CA 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, 
Chad Arthur Gardiner, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Orrae (On Rule 31 hearing). 
Defendant appeals his conviction of assault on a police 
officer, arising out of defendant physically resisting the 
officer's attempt to search certain business premises owned by 
defendant's father. Defendant argues that he was justified in 
striking the officer because the attempted warrantless search 
was unlawful. 
'k 
« & 
* % 
We agree with defendant that there were no exigent 
circumstances that permitted the police officer to legally 
conduct a warrantless search of the premises for alcohol being 
served to minors. But, even though that is the issue that has 
been raised and argued by both parties, it is not the relevant 
issue in this case. The legality or illegality of the search 
cannot justify defendant's conduct nor excuse his offense. 
Defendant had no right to resist a peaceful search# 
regardless of whether that search might ultimately be 
determined legal or illegal# unless defendant can show that the 
officer was not reasonably identified as a police officer, was 
not acting pursuant to his authority, or had used excessive 
force- Elson v. State. 659 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Alaska 1983). 
Accord U.S. v. Ferrone. 438 F.2d 381, 390 (3rd Cir. 1971), 
certt fl&niefl 402 U.S. 1008 (1971); State v. Doe. 92 N.M. 100, 
583 P.2d 464, 466-7 (1978). The trial court found that the 
officer acted in performance of his official duties. Defendant 
does not challenge the court's specific finding that the 
officer reasonably acted to preserve his own safety when he 
pushed defendant away and that the force used was not excessive. 
We reject defendants argument that he is entitled to 
resist a search which he deems to be illegal. Any traditional 
common law sanction for such conduct is anachronistic and no 
longer justifiable. See People v. Hess. 687 P.2d 443 (Colo 
1984). When society has provided other adequate legal means to 
obtain an impartial review and resolution of legal disputes, 
the necessity for a self-help remedy, such as physically 
resisting an officer who is performing his duty, is radically 
dissipated. Our society need no longer tolerate such efforts. 
Ellison v. State, 410 P.2d 519, 525 (Del. Super. 1979). The 
resistance to a questionable search or arrest can lead to 
violence and injury, as in this case. Self-help may well 
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invite graver consequences to the accused and the officer than 
any injury occasioned by the search or arrest itself. State v. 
D_fifi, 583 P.2d at 467; State v. Hatton. 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 
1040, 1045-46 (1977). 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
DATED this I Y day of April, 1989 
FOR THE COURT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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RECEIVED 
UM 1 0 1989 
McRAE & DeLAND 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
r i L. c u 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Chad Arthur Gardiner, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Garff, 
ORDER 
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Court of Appeals No- 880557-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is 
denied. 
DATED th .ii day of May, 1989T 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary y. Ttfoonan 
CleKl/'of the Court 
J 
Df May, 1989/ a true and 
3d to each of the 
parties named below by depositing the same in the United States mail. 
Harry H. Souvall 
McRae & DeLand 
Attorneys at Law 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Alvin G. Nash 
Attorneys at Law 
Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Vernal Circuit Court 
#305 Uintah County Building 
147 East Main 
Vernal, UT 84078 
#881000203 and #8801000204 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1989. 
/ 
By ^ - ^ v £ - ; c " • * * > CaseTfaanager 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT IH 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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CONSTITUTION OP UTAH ART. I, § 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 7. 
Cross-Beferences. 
Controlled Substances Act, search war-
rants, 58-37-10. 
Liquor, search, seizure and confiscation, 
32-8-16 et seq. 
Statutory provisions generally, 77-54-1 
et seq. 
In general. 
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum 
nor under a motion to examine will an 
examination be permitted of a nature to 
contravene provision against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Evans v. Evans, 98 
U. 189, 98 P. 2d 703. 
It is generally recognized that the legiti-
mate use of a search warrant is restricted 
to public prosecutions, and in no event 
may such proceeding be invoked for the 
protection of a mere private right. Allen 
v. Trueman, Judge, 100 U. 36, 110 P. 2d 
355. 
It is use to which it is put that renders 
property, otherwise lawful and rightful 
to have, use and possess, subject to seizure 
and forfeiture. Hemenway & Moser Co. 
v. Funk, 100 U. 72, 106 P. 2d 779. 
For general discussion of Fourth Amend-
ment to federal Constitution, see City of 
Price v. Jaynes, 113 U. 89, 191 P. 2d 606. 
Where police officers have obtained evi-
dence by illegal methods, such as an un-
lawful search in violation of this section, 
it should not be used to convict a person 
of crime. State v. Louden, 15 U. (2d) 64, 
387 P. 2d 240. 
Relying on tip, officers obtained per-
mission from proprietor of motel to enter 
defendant's room where they found a pis-
tol in a drawer which they identified as 
having been stolen in a burglary of a 
shopping center. After replacing the pistol 
in the drawer they waited outside for the 
return of the occupants of the motel room. 
The officers, on obtaining defendant's per-
mission to search the room, in addition to 
the pistol, found wrist watches and crow-
bars which also came from the shopping 
center. On the trial of defendant for sec-
ond degree burglary, trial court properly 
admitted evidence obtained during such 
search as the search was not unreasonable. 
State v. Louden, 15 U. (2d) 64, 387 P. 2d 
240. 
Whether a search and seizure is reason-
able is to be determined by the trial court, 
and evidence in plain view of the officer 
pursuing a felon may be rightfully seized 
and such seizure is not a violation of the 
federal constitutional protection as set 
forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 6 
L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684. State v. 
Allred, 16 U. (2d) 41, 395 P. 2d 535. 
Automobile search, 
Evidence taken from automobile de-
fendant was driving and subsequently 
used to convict him of burglary and 
grand larceny did not violate constitu-
tional proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, even though taking 
was not connected with cause of arrest 
and was done without search warrant in 
view of facts that car was lawfully taken 
into possession and impounded when de-
fendant was arrested for driving auto-
mobile which did not belong to him and 
without valid driver's license and since, 
under such circumstances, it was responsi-
bility of police impounding car to take 
inventory of its contents. State v. Criscola, 
21 U. (2d) 272, 444 P. 2d 517. 
City ordinance. 
City ordinance allegedly enacted pursu-
ant to powers granted by 10-8-50, provid-
ing that right of people of city "to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated," and making 
violation thereof misdemeanor, was void 
for vagueness and uncertainty in failing 
to define or prescribe standards to deter-
mine what acts constitute unreasonable 
searches or seizures. City of Price v. 
Jaynes, 113 U. 89, 191 P. 2d 606. 
Drugs. 
Marijuana taken during the search of 
defendant's home pursuant to warrant was 
unlawfully taken and evidence should 
have been suppressed on defendant's mo-
tion because search warrant was based 
on police officer's oral deposition rather 
than on oath or affirmation. State v. Jasso, 
21 U. (2d) 24, 439 P. 2d 844. 
Liquor, 
Where police officers were investigating 
rooming house under city ordinance to 
determine if liquor was being sold there, 
171 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 70-5-103 
Letter Included offense. 
Hie offense of assault is a lesser included 
offense 0/ aggravated sexual assault, 
f 7&-6-405. State v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 
1982). 
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnap-
ping was entitled to a jury instruction on as-
sault as a lesser included offense since there 
was sufficient overlap in elements of two of-
fenses and if jury had accepted defendant's ver-
sion of evidence, however unlikely that might 
have been, it could have voted to acquit him of 
aggravated kidnapping and convict him of as-
sault. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 
1984). 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.4, enacted by L. 
1974, ch. 32, § 32; 1987, ch. 23, i 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1987 amendment 
substituted "a peace officer, and when the 
peace officer is acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer" for "on duty." 
Defense of habitation. 
Defendant's appearances at his estranged 
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him 
no proprietary right or justification to consider 
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation,* 
and his aggravated assault on his wife's over-
night male companion was therefore not justi-
fied by § 76-2-405. State v. McKenna, 728 P 2d 
984 (Utah 1986). 
Evidence. 
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the 
trial court's admission of a knife, similar to the 
Object of threat 
-Vict im. 
One cannot be charged with an aggravated 
assault of a particular person (x) by "threaten-
ing to do bodily injury to [another personf (u). 
The "another" referred to in this section and 
§ 76-5-103 is the ultimate victim of the as-
sault, not any other person. State v. Garcia, 
744 P.2d 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 
1985). 
A.L.R. — Liability for injury to martial arts 
participant, 47 A.L.R.4th 403. 
Cross-References. — Assault on conserva-
tion officer, § 23-20-26. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
one used in the assault, and a ruler, illustra-
tive of the testimony of a witness and indica-
tive of the actual length of the weapon, was not 
unduly prejudicial. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 
168 (Utah 1985). 
—Sufficient. 
The defendant's conduct in pulling a loaded 
38 caliber revolver from his waistband and 
shooting one of his victims in the upper leg, 
followed by threats to both victims, was suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction under 
subsection (1Kb). State v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301 
(Utah 1985). 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer. 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority 
as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
ANALYSIS 
Defense of habitation. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficent. 
Lesser included offense. 
Object of threat. 
—Victim. 
Recklessness. 
Self defense. 
Serious bodily injury. 
Threatening with dangerous weapon distinguished. 
Voluntary intoxication. 
Cited. 
41 
76-8-301. Interference with public servant 
Constitutionality. 
This section it not unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Theobald, 646 P 2d 50 (Utah 1982). 
76-8-305. Interference with peace officer making lawful 
arrest. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and inter-
feres with such arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon. 
History: C. 1963, 76-8-305, enacted by L. § 76-8-305), relating to interference with law 
1981, ch. 62, I 1. enforcement official seeking to detain 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1981, ch. 62,} 1 interferor or another, and enacted new 
repealed old § 76-8-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-305. 
76-8-306. Obstructing justice. 
( D A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or 
delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of 
another for the commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it from a magis-
trate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other 
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid in 
the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person; 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from perform-
ing an act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or 
conviction of the person; or 
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement officer has been autho-
rized or has applied for authorization under either Section 77-23a-10 or 
77-23a-15 to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives 
notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person. 
(2) An offense under Subsectioiffif) (a) through (fri^a class B misdemeanor, 
unless the actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a 
felony of the first degree, in which case it is a second degree felony. 
(3) An offense under Subsection (g) is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-306, enacted by L. (ff for "this section" and "second degree fei-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-306; 1988, ch. 251,* 1. onyw for "felony of the second degree" in Sub-
Compiler's Notes. — The 1988 amendment, section (2); added Subsection (3); and made 
effective April 25, 1988, added Subsection minor stylistic changes, 
(IXg), substituted '"Subsection (IMa) through 
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